In this paper we introduce the problem of dynamic pricing of power for smart-grid networks. We consider a network utility maximization (NUM) framework in a deterministic setting with a single provider, multiple users and a finite horizon. The provider produces power or buys power in a (deterministic) spot market, and determines a dynamic price to charge the users. The users then adjust their demand in response to the time-varying prices. This is typically categorized as the problem of demand response, and we study a progression of related models by focusing on the characterization of the structure of the optimal dynamic prices in the Smart Grid and the optimal demand and supply under various interaction with a spot market.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Smart Grid takes shape, new possibilities of efficient management of the electric power grid open up. One of these is pricing of electricity to consumers. Currently, temporal variations in the cost of electricity are hidden behind inflexible rate designs. This leads to inefficiencies with over-consumption during peak times, and under-consumption during off-peak times. It also makes the problem of matching demand and supply, both of which are uncertain, and affect grid stability, particularly acute. In the United States, only 60-100 hours of the year can account for 10-18 percent of the system peak load [1] . Meeting this critical peak load requires installation, operation and maintenance of expensive combustion gas-turbine generators, since these start almost instantaneously.
Dynamic pricing of electricity to consumers can remedy this problem by inducing consumers to switch off or defer some of the non-urgent, non-critical loads. For example, dish-washers in most households have a delayed start option. And yet, only a small fraction of consumers utilize this feature and use the appliance later at night at off-peak times. Dynamic pricing can make consumers sensitive to their time and amount of electricity consumption, thus potentially smoothing out peak-time system loads, and enhancing economic efficiency.
Dynamic pricing rate designs are receiving increased attention by state commissions, with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) having set a deadline of 2011 for the state electric utilities to propose dynamic pricing rate structures. These are defined as an electric rate structure that reflects the actual wholesale market conditions. Dynamic pricing can take various forms such as critical peak-pricing, time-of-use pricing and real-time pricing. CPUC defines Q. Wang the real-time price as the rate linked to the actual price in the wholesale hourly electricity market [2] . Such prices can be communicated to the consumers over the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), or a smart-grid network [3] and displayed on a smart meter.
Literature Overview. Problems related to the design and operation of a Smart Grid are receiving increasing attention. The problem of dynamic pricing to shape demand is typically called demand response. There exists a large literature on demand response; the most relevant is [4] . This paper formulates the problem of optimal demand response in discrete time over a finite time horizon when users have some storage available, and the formulation can be categorized as NUM. Using Lagrangian duality, it establishes the existence of a solution, and gives a distributed algorithm based on gradient projection to compute this solution. The modeling of various appliances into the proposed optimization framework is also studied. In [5] , a different approach is taken wherein demand is required to match supply, and users bid for load-shedding in an iterative supply function bidding mechanism, that was first proposed in [6] . Both competitive and Nash equilibrium analysis is provided but the focus is on a single instant, and without storage. In [7] , the focus is on optimal power flow through the network, wherein existence of a zero duality gap solution is proved. In contrast to aforementioned work, particularly [4] , in this paper we study a progression of related models by focusing on the characterization of the structure of the optimal dynamic prices in the Smart Grid and the optimal demand and supply under various interaction with a spot market.
Results and organization of this paper. The system model is first presented in Section II, and two related problems are introduced. The first problem SYSTEM is a simplified special case of the main model with internalized production cost, which provides a preliminary framework for more realistic refinement. Its optimal solution is characterized in Section III based on a dual decomposition; moreover, a distributed algorithm to solve SYSTEM, which can be readily adapted for problems in the same family, is also proposed. In Section IV we extend the SYSTEM problem to the scenario where the provider may purchase in part from a spot market with an exogenous cost to narrow the demand-supply gap. This is referred to as the SYS SPOT problem, and the interaction between the decision of purchase and the spot market price is investigated. We show that there is a threshold value of the spot market price, below which no purchase is made and this threshold is explicitly given by the dual solution to SYSTEM. We also illustrate this result numerically using sample problems. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
Consider a smart-grid network that consists of n users or households, and one provider. We consider a discretetime model with a finite horizon t f . A user i consumes x i (t) power at time step t, and the supply by the grid is denoted as z i (t). The excess supply/demand is charged to/discharged from the user's battery with capacity B i . The energy level/state of the battery before operation at time t is denoted by y i (t). We assume that the total supply from the grid at time t is upper bounded by C t , and the total demand of user i over time is upper bounded by D i . For convenience we define the following column vector forms of the above quantities: the demand of user i,
T ; the supply of the
the supply constraint of the grid C = C 0 , C 1 , · · · , C t f T ; the demand constraint of users
with vect(u 1 , . . . , u n ) being the stacked vector from u 1 to u n , and similarly define y and z. When user i draws power x i over time, her satisfaction is measured by the utility function
where V i : R + → R + is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable function of x i (t). Denote byẏ i (t) the change of battery state of user i at time t:
Assuming zero initial state, y(0) = 0, we then have
Therefore,
In addition, since the battery suffers wear and tear due to usage, we model maintenance and operational costs as
where m : R + → R + is a strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice differentiable function of y i (t). The objective is to maximize the sum of individual utilities of both users and the provider or the social welfare. Formally, we consider the following two related problems in this paper. The main model is given as follows.
where P : R n(t f +1) + → R + is the production cost function to be specified later, and the symbol denotes componentwise inequality, and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) T with proper sizes. We begin with a simplified special case of this problem by assuming P = 0; this is denoted as SYSTEM (U, M, B, H, C, D). The motivation for studying this degenerated model is twofold: 1) it models the scenario when the production cost is realized thus fixed before the distribution of energy or when the marginal cost is zero such as in the case of renewable energies; 2) more critically, it provides a preliminary framework that reveals the basic structure of optimal solutions and their algorithmic implementation that can be readily extended to more realistic models.
We then consider the setting wherein the grid may purchase power from an external spot market to narrow the demand-supply gap, while incurring an exogenous cost; this is formulated as the SYS SPOT (U, M, B, H, C, D; σ) problem as follows.
where σ = σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . σ t f is the price vector of unit power in the spot market, and [·] + = max{·, 0}. Our main interest in this problem is the characterization of spot market prices that may incentivize the exogenous purchase.
In particular, we show that there is a threshold price below which this purchase is justified, and it is closely related to the optimal solution to SYSTEM. In the next section we start with SYSTEM, and note that when constraint (4) is decoupled, the SYSTEM problem can be separated into several subproblems. This observation motivates us to consider the dual-decomposition based technique to solve the SYSTEM problem [8] , [9] , which we show next.
III. DUAL DECOMPOSITION OF SYSTEM AND THE
PROPERTIES OF ITS SOLUTIONS In this section the SYSTEM problem is analyzed based on a dual decomposition, which also prompts a distributed first-order algorithm to solve it, and the properties of both the primal and the dual optimal solutions (demand, supply and prices) are discussed.
A. Dual decomposition
We first reformulate SYSTEM (U, M, B, H, C, D) as
where the domain and the feasible region are respectively given by
Note that (relint D) ∩ F is nonempty when B, C and D are all positive, as we shall assume so. In addition, since this problem is convex and the inequality constraint is affine, Slater's condition is then satisfied, and hence, strong duality holds [10] . Because of the strict concavity of the objective function in x and y, there are unique optima for x, y and z. As pointed out before, the structure of SYSTEM prompts a solution based on a dual decomposition. Its Lagrangian is given by
Let ν = vect(ν 1 , . . . , ν n ). The dual function is then given by
and
being two subproblems for user i. Since the minimization with respect to z i is readily solved, the dual problem is given by DUAL SYS (U, M, B , H, C, D):
are the optimal values of problem (15) and (16) for a given ν i . Given now this dual decomposition structure, a distributed algorithm can be readily proposed to solve SYSTEM, and this is widely studied in the literature, see e.g. [8] , [4] . We report our version of the algorithm in Appendix I and show its convergence.
B. Properties of solutions to SYSTEM and DUAL SYS
Denote by x ⋆ = vect(x ⋆ 1 , . . . , x ⋆ n ) the optimum for x in SYSTEM; ν ⋆ is an optimal solution for ν of DUAL SYS, and similarly define y ⋆ , z ⋆ and θ ⋆ , respectively. Our first result is the following claim.
The proof can be found in Appendix II. Remark 1: H T ν i can be interpreted as the price vector that the provider charges from user i for each unit of consumed energy, in light of subproblem USER i . Since z i (t) is the total amount of energy distributed to user i at time t, under this interpretation it is as if the energy buffered in battery were only charged when it is later consumed while incurring a storage cost before the consumption. This obviously is not what actually happens in practice, but serves as an interesting interpretation of the result. We do note that if there is no battery buffering in the model, this interpretation is consistent with the notion of shadow price in the literature (see e.g. [11] , [12] ).
is then uniquely determined for each i; 2) alternatively, if we assume that x ⋆ i ∈ int X i for at least one i, say i k , and z ⋆ i k ≻ 0, H T ν ⋆ i k is then uniquely determined and from the minimization with respect to z i k it yields that θ ⋆ = H T ν ⋆ i k . In either case, θ ⋆ is also uniquely determined.
In Section IV, we will consider the situation where there is a gap between the users demand and the power generation capacity of the grid at some time instants. At those instants, the grid may purchase power from the spot market to narrow the demand-supply gap. We will show therein that the above unique θ ⋆ is a "lower bound" on the price of unit power in the spot market above which the grid decides to make no purchase.
Also, we can determine the closed form of y ⋆ given ν ⋆ based on (16) . Since the objective and the constraint are both separable in time, we conclude
. We then obtain
. Therefore, at optimality the marginal cost of postponing the power purchase from t − 1 to t is equal to the marginal cost of storing the energy in battery after purchasing in t − 1, which is intuitively appealing. When the demand is known and fixed a priori, some structural results on the optimal power generation and battery scheduling in a single user setting can be found in [13] .
IV. SPOT MARKET
In this section, we consider the SYS SPOT problem. As before, we reformulate its domain and the feasible region as in SYSTEM, and there are unique optima for x, y and z because of the strict concavity of the objective function in x and y.
Denote by z ⋆ (σ) = (z ⋆ 1 (σ), . . . , z ⋆ n (σ)) the optimal solution for z to SYS SPOT given σ. Define
In the following, we characterize S using the solutions to SYSTEM and its dual DUAL SYS. To avoid ambiguity, symbols without hat are variables in SYS SPOT, and others are for SYSTEM and its dual. We assume that either of the two cases below is true:
Recall that x ⋆ i denotes the optimal solution to SYS SPOT for x i , and X i is the feasible set of (15) . We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: σ ∈ S if and only if σ θ ⋆ , noting that θ ⋆ is the optimal dual variable in DUAL SYS (U, M, B, H, C, D).
Proof: 1) Necessity. First of all, the Lagrangian of SYS SPOT is given by L(x, y, z, ν, µ),
Group the terms in a similar way as in DUAL SYS, and the dual problem is
where W ⋆ i and R ⋆ i are the respective optimal values of problems (15) and (16) for a given ν i as in DUAL SYS, and G ⋆ (ν; σ) is the optimal value of
Because of strong duality 1 , the optimal solution (x ⋆ , y ⋆ , z ⋆ ) to SYS SPOT is also the maximizer of the Lagrangian L(x, y, z, ν ⋆ ) where ν ⋆ is an optimal solution to the dual. Therefore, z ⋆ is an optimal solution to (17) for all t. Under assumption b) we have ν ⋆ i k = ν ⋆ i k and θ ⋆ = H T ν ⋆ i k . In either case, it follows that σ θ ⋆ . 2) Sufficiency. We only provide an outline of the proof here. Our strategy is to show that the optimal solution ( x ⋆ , y ⋆ , z ⋆ ) to SYSTEM with optimal dual variables ( ν ⋆ , θ ⋆ ) also satisfies the KKT conditions of SYS SPOT when σ θ ⋆ , and then because of strong duality and convexity of SYS SPOT, it is also the optimal solution to SYS SPOT with optimal dual variables ν ⋆ = ν ⋆ , given the spot market price σ. To this end, note that the KKT conditions of SYS SPOT only differ from those of SYSTEM in the dual feasibility and the stationarity conditions because of the replacement of θ with σ and the non-differentiable term in the objective function. Recall that θ ⋆ (t) = max i H T ν ⋆ i t for all t, and we have σ H T ν ⋆ i if σ θ ⋆ . Let ∂ zi L denote the subdifferential of the Lagrangian of SYS SPOT with respect to z i for all i. Hence, when σ θ ⋆ and ν i = ν ⋆ i , 0 ∈ ∂ zi L for all z i = z ⋆ i , and hence combining other optimality conditions, we obtain ( x ⋆ , y ⋆ , z ⋆ , ν ⋆ ) is a primaldual optimal solution given σ θ ⋆ .
In the rest of this section, we numerically illustrate the demand sensitivity to spot market price that we studied above, using two sample problems that are specified in Table I . As shown in Proposition 2, θ ⋆ assumes the threshold value of the spot market price σ, and in Figure 1 and 2 we tune σ in three different ways to demonstrate the behaviors of the optimal demand. The tests are performed for both sample problems and we elaborate the one with n = 10, t f = 4 for example. In the first scenario, we set σ(t) = θ ⋆ (t) for t > 0 and σ(0) = κ · θ ⋆ (0), where κ is a tunable parameter. We scale the third entry of σ in the second scenario and the entire price vector in the third one. In Figure 1 and 2, we plot the curves of [ n i=1 z i − C] + 1 versus κ, respectively. As can be seen in the figures, the demand increases as κ decreases when κ < 1 until hitting the demand constraint, and remains unchanged when κ ≥ 1, as suggested by Proposition 2. V. CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper, we have studied key features of optimal dynamic prices in smart-grid networks. Under the framework shown in this paper, there are several interesting open questions to investigate further. The first is the development of faster distributed algorithms for NUM in smart-grid networks. Recently, distributed Newton's method has been proposed for NUM (see [14] , [15] , [16] for details.) which illustrates significant improvement over convergence rate; however, these attempts are mainly designed to solve the primal algorithm which is categorized in the domain of dynamic resource slicing instead of dynamic pricing. An attempt of adopting distributed Newton's method to problems in this paper, especially SYSTEM is presented in our full version [17] . Alternatively, we present in [17] a greedy approach to facilitate the solution process of the aggregate NUM problem with the optimality gap between the greedy solution and the optimal one characterized. The explicit structure of the optimal control under general cost functions of power production and energy buffering is another direction of future research, which in a single-user case is also presented in [17] as a preliminary step.
APPENDIX I A DUAL-DECOMPOSITION BASED DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Let
Define x ⋆ i (ν i ) and y ⋆ i (ν i ) 2 as the respective unique maximizers of (15) and (16) . Let Q k = Q(ν k , θ k ). We solve DUAL SYS using the gradient projection method, and the updating rule in the kth iteration is given by
where α k is a diminishing step-size satisfying
e.g., α k = 1+Γ k+Γ with Γ a fixed non-negative number, and [x 0 ] X is the projection of x 0 onto a set X , or defined as the following constrained quadratic program
subject to x ∈ X Because all gradients are bounded with diminishing stepsize α k , the gradient projection method converges for the dual problem [18] , [19] , [8] . Since x ⋆ i (ν i ) and y ⋆ i (ν i ) are the respective unique maximizers of (15) and (16) and the strong duality holds, x ⋆ i (ν ⋆ i ) and y ⋆ i (ν ⋆ i ) are primal optimal, where ν ⋆ i are the solutions to the dual problem. To summarize, we have the following:
First-Order Algorithm for Power Distribution
User i's algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . ., 1) Receives from the grid the dual variables ν k i 2) Computes x ⋆ i (ν k i ) and y ⋆ i (ν k i ), and communicates them to the grid Grid's algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . ., 1) Receives from each user x ⋆ i (ν k i ) and y ⋆ i (ν k i ) for all i 2) Computes the dual variable ν k+1 i and θ k+1 for all i, and communicates them accordingly to each user The algorithm would terminate when the following stopping criterion is satisfied:
where ǫ is a predefined constant.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We prove by contradiction. Assume that there exists at least one i such that (H T ν ⋆ i ) t = t f s=t ν ⋆ i (s) < 0 for some t. Let I = arg min t (H T ν ⋆ i ) t . We first note that x ⋆ = 0 and furthermore there exists t 0 ∈ I such that x ⋆ i (t 0 ) > 0. Otherwise, one can switch the value of x ⋆ i (t 0 ) with that of some positive entry in x ⋆ i and obtain an improved value of W i (x i ; ν ⋆ i ), which is a contradiction to the fact that x ⋆ i is the maximizer of W i (x i ; ν ⋆ i ). Therefore, 1) if there exists t < t 0 such that (
where "y ← x" signifies assigning the value of x to y. By doing so, the value of W i is strictly decreased while that of R i is non-decreasing and the feasibility constraints are maintained. We thus obtain an improved dual objective value, which leads to a contradiction. 2) If (H T ν ⋆ i ) t = (H T ν ⋆ i ) t0 for all t < t 0 if any, we set ν ⋆ i (t 0 ) ← ν ⋆ i (t 0 ) + ǫ where 0 < ǫ < −(H T ν ⋆ i ) t0 , and the same argument applies as in 1).
